New York Jets interim head coach Jeff Ulbrich announced on Thursday that passing game coordinator Todd Downing will replace offensive coordinator Nathaniel Hackett as the team’s offensive play caller, starting with their Week 6 game against the Buffalo Bills.
Here is a full look at Downing’s coaching resume:
- 2023-24: Passing Game Coordinator, New York Jets (HC Robert Saleh)
- 2021-22: Offensive Coordinator, Tennessee Titans (HC Mike Vrabel)
- 2019-21: Tight Ends Coach, Tennessee Titans (HC Mike Vrabel)
- 2018: Offensive Assistant, Minnesota Vikings (HC Mike Zimmer)
- 2017: Offensive Coordinator, Oakland Raiders (HC Jack Del Rio)
- 2015-16: Quarterbacks Coach, Oakland Raiders (HC Jack Del Rio)
- 2014: Quarterbacks Coach, Buffalo Bills (HC Doug Marrone)
- 2011-13: Quarterbacks Coach, Detroit Lions (HC Jim Schwartz)
- 2010: Assistant Quarterbacks Coach, Detroit Lions (HC Jim Schwartz)
- 2009: Offensive Quality Control, Detroit Lions (HC Jim Schwartz)
- 2008: Defensive Quality Control, St. Louis Rams (HC Scott Linehan)
- 2006-07: Defensive/ST Assistant, St. Louis Rams (HC Scott Linehan)
- 2005: Offensive Quality Control, Minnesota Vikings (HC Mike Tice)
- 2003-04: Football Systems Analyst, Minnesota Vikings (HC Mike Tice)
Outside of Hackett, Downing is the only other offensive coach on the Jets’ staff with play calling experience. He was the Oakland Raiders’ offensive coordinator in 2017 and the Tennessee Titans’ offensive coordinator from 2021-22.
Is Downing’s resume as a play caller any better than Hackett’s? Let’s look into his three seasons as an offensive coordinator.
2017 Oakland Raiders
Downing was promoted to the Raiders’ offensive coordinator role in 2017 after spending two seasons as their quarterbacks coach.
As the quarterbacks coach, Downing played a key role in the development of Derek Carr. Prior to Downing’s arrival, Carr had a historically rough 2014 rookie season in which he threw for only 5.5 yards per attempt. Downing was brought in after Carr’s rookie year, and Carr made the Pro Bowl in each of the next two seasons.
Oakland entered the 2017 season with high expectations after a 12-win campaign in 2016. Carr was entering his fourth season and the team added star running back Marshawn Lynch.
The Raiders underwhelmed in 2017, dropping from 12 wins to 6, and it was mostly due to their fall-off on offense. They dropped from 7th in scoring (26 PPG) in 2016 to 23rd under Downing (18.8).
Interestingly, Oakland’s offense earned similar or better rankings in many key categories. In 2016, they were 13th in net yards per pass attempt, 10th in yards per rush attempt, 17th in third down conversion rate, and 14th in red zone touchdown rate. In 2017, they were 13th, 13th, 11th, and 7th, respectively.
The main cause of the decline was simple: turnovers. In 2016, Oakland had only 14 turnovers, the fourth-fewest. That number doubled to 28 in 2017, the fifth-most. Carr’s interception total more than doubled, going from 6 to 13.
How much of that is on Downing? It is difficult to say without analyzing every turnover, but from an overall lens, turnovers seem like a category that is less dependent on coaching than most others. The team’s per-play efficiency at passing and rushing, its third-down conversion rate, and its red-zone touchdown rate are all areas that can be traced back to coaching over a full-season sample, but turnovers are fluky and often caused by an individual player’s mistake. If Oakland’s offense really did decline solely due to turnovers, that probably wasn’t Downing’s fault.
Despite the hype surrounding Oakland entering 2017, that roster looks thin in hindsight.
The Raiders’ leading receiver was 30-year-old tight end Jared Cook with 688 yards. Their most-targeted player was 30-year-old wide receiver Michael Crabtree. Lynch was 31 years old and coming off a season in which he was retired. Downing coaching this team to top-half rankings in net yards per pass attempt, yards per rush attempt, third-down conversion rate, and red zone touchdown rate should be viewed as an accomplishment on his resume.
Not to mention, the overall offensive decline from 2016 to 2017 was not actually as severe as the scoring drop-off (7th to 23rd in PPG) makes it seem. In terms of offensive DVOA, the Raiders only fell from 7th to 13th.
Oakland cleaned house after 2017, firing head coach Jack Del Rio and Downing along with him.
I came into this analysis expecting to chalk up 2017 as a negative on Downing’s resume, but after looking at it more closely, it really wasn’t that bad. Oakland had an overhyped roster, and despite that, they were still efficient in many offensive categories, only underachieving due to a massive spike in turnovers.
2021 Tennessee Titans
Downing joined the Titans’ coaching staff in 2019 as a tight ends coach under head coach Mike Vrabel and offensive coordinator Arthur Smith. He served in that role for two seasons.
Tight end Jonnu Smith upped his game under Downing’s watch, setting back-to-back career highs in both receptions and receiving yards in 2019 and 2020. Smith and the rest of Tennessee’s tight end unit also played a key blocking role in Tennessee’s run-heavy offense.
Arthur Smith was hired as the Falcons’ head coach in 2021, and Downing was promoted to fill Smith’s role as the offensive coordinator.
Tennessee had high expectations entering 2021. They were coming off back-to-back playoff appearances, including a run to the AFC championship in 2019 and an 11-win season in 2020. The Titans retained the same offensive core and identity that sparked their success: a run-first attack led by Derrick Henry, backed by a play-action-heavy passing game featuring quarterback Ryan Tannehill and star receiver A.J. Brown.
With the Titans’ big three still in place, Downing hardly changed the team’s identity in 2021. After the Titans ranked third in 2020 with a run-play rate of 50.3%, Downing had them at second place in 2021, albeit with a slightly lower rate of 48.8%.
The Titans went 12-5 in 2021, earning the AFC’s top seed, although they fell in the Divisional round to Cincinnati. Despite the team’s overall success, the offense declined from elite in 2020 to average in 2021. After ranking 4th in scoring (30.7 PPG) in 2020, they dropped to 15th in 2021 (24.6 PPG). The DVOA drop-off was larger, going from 5th in 2020 to 20th in 2021.
Tennessee was less efficient at moving the ball in both phases. The passing game dropped from 7th in net yards per attempt (7.2) to 21st (5.9), while the run game dropped from 2nd in yards per attempt (5.2) to 14th (4.4).
On the positive side, the Titans’ situational execution remained excellent, which is a big reason why they won 12 games despite their overall efficiency declining. After ranking 5th on third down and 2nd in the red zone in 2020, they still ranked 8th and 5th, respectively, in 2021. This helped them go 6-2 in one-score games.
Like the 2016-17 Raiders, the Titans saw a spike in turnovers after Downing took over. The 2020 Titans had the 2nd-fewest turnovers (12) while the 2021 Titans had the 10th-most (25). Tannehill saw his interception total double from 7 to 14.
Considering the turnover spike has happened twice under Downing, it is fair to wonder if there is something about his play calling that results in turnovers increasing. Still, I lean toward this being bad luck rather than an indicator of Downing’s coaching. If it persists in 2024 with the historically turnover-averse (except for last week) Aaron Rodgers at quarterback, then it is probably Downing’s fault at that point.
While the 2021 output looks underwhelming at first glance, it is more understandable when considering the hand Downing was dealt.
The Titans lost wide receiver Corey Davis in the 2021 offseason, who was a massive part of their passing efficiency in 2020 (65 receptions, 984 yards, 5 TD, 10.7 yards per target in 14 games). The Titans did not adequately replace him; their second-leading receiver in 2021 was Nick Westbrook-Ikhine (38 receptions, 476 yards, 4 TD, 8.4 yards per target in 16 games). Losing Davis definitely hampered the passing game’s explosiveness, and failing to replicate his reliability could have resulted in Tannehill becoming more turnover-prone.
Davis was a big loss, but we have yet to address the most significant factor in all of this: Tennessee dealt with significant injury troubles in 2021 after experiencing great health in 2020.
Henry missed nine games in 2021, while Brown missed four games and exited early in two others. Compare this to the 2020 team, which only saw two combined missed games between Henry and Brown.
Downing had the Titans rolling along just fine in 2021 when the stars were healthy. In eight games with Henry on the field, they averaged 28.4 points per game and went 6-2. In six games with both Brown and Henry healthy for at least half of the game, they averaged 29.7 points per game and went 5-1. Even in six games with just Brown and no Henry, the Titans averaged 24.3 points per game and went 5-1.
Much like his performance with the 2017 Raiders, Downing’s performance with the 2021 Titans does not seem as bad when you add context. The decline can mostly be chalked up to a major increase in injuries (plus the loss of Davis) and another spike in turnovers (maybe his fault, maybe not). When the Titans had their best players on the field, it was still a very good unit that excelled in key situations and led its team to 12 wins.
2022 Tennessee Titans
Things came crashing down for Downing and the Titans in 2022. On their way to a 7-10 season, they finished 28th in scoring with 17.5 points per game and 30th in total offense with 296.8 yards per game.
However, Downing’s circumstances in 2022 were nearly impossible to navigate. I’m not sure if Kyle Shanahan would have done much better in that situation.
First and foremost, A.J. Brown was traded to Philadelphia in the offseason, leaving the Titans’ top three receivers (in targets) as a 30-year-old Robert Woods, tight end Austin Hooper, and first-round bust Treylon Burks. You will be hard-pressed to find a worse top-three in recent NFL history.
The offensive line lost three-time Pro Bowl left tackle Taylor Lewan for the season after two games. This resulted in 15 starts on the blind side from Dennis Daley, who finished the season as Pro Football Focus’ lowest-graded left tackle in the NFL (min. 300 snaps at LT). Daley is not on an NFL roster as of October 10, 2024.
Pro Bowl center Ben Jones missed five games, as did right guard Nate Davis, a solid starter who went on to earn a contract for $10 million per year after the season.
Quarterback Ryan Tannehill was also hampered by injuries. He missed two games with an ankle injury, returned for six games, then re-aggravated it and missed the final three games.
Despite all of this, the Titans’ offense was not actually that bad. They were better than their rankings in scoring (28th) and total offense (30th) would suggest, as they finished 21st in offensive DVOA.
The Titans’ DVOA success relative to their PPG and YPG makes sense when you look at their per-play averages and situational metrics. They were 22nd in net yards per pass attempt (5.8) and 16th in yards per rush attempt (4.4). They also excelled in the red zone, ranking 6th with a 64.3% touchdown rate. The Titans had a third-down conversion rate of 36.5%, ranking 23rd, which isn’t terrible and is shockingly competent considering the talent level of that team.
It is worth noting that Tennessee ranked 17th-best with 23 turnovers, an improvement compared to their 23rd-ranked total of 25 turnovers in 2021 (the fact that they improved in 2022 despite the massive talent reduction shows how fluky turnovers are).
It becomes even more impressive on Downing’s part that Tennessee ranked 21st in offensive DVOA when considering the passing game was inoperable for five whole games. In five starts without Tannehill, the Titans averaged 114 passing yards per game; starting quarterbacks Malik Willis and Joshua Dobbs combined to complete 55% of their passes and throw for 5.3 yards per attempt.
Yet again, I think Downing gets a bad rap if you look at his overall offensive numbers without context. After the loss of Brown and the numerous injuries they faced, the collective talent level that Downing was forced to use in 2022 was CFL-caliber. Despite that, he still led them to 21st in offensive DVOA. I consider that a net positive performance by Downing compared to the expectations of the situation.
Todd Downing: Better than people think?
Going into this study, my hypothesis was that I would find Downing’s resume to be no better than Hackett’s. It is easy to look at the offensive rankings of Downing’s teams and come to that conclusion.
When you apply context, though, Downing’s past performances as an offensive coordinator seem a lot more competent than they appear at first glance.
I am not saying the Jets secretly had Sean McVay waiting in the wings for all this time, but Downing seems like a respectable offensive leader who, at the very least, gets what is expected out of the talent at his disposal. The sense I get from his past three seasons is that he is an average play caller who does not elevate or worsen his team in any significantly noticeable way.
Downing’s apparently dismal offensive rankings have mainly been caused by poor talent, bad injury luck, and spikes in turnovers. However, Downing has consistently led his teams to solid rankings relative to their talent level in yards per play, third down efficiency, and red zone efficiency. He must prove in 2024 that the turnover spikes we saw from the 2016-17 Raiders and the 2021-22 Titans were not his doing, but other than that, I am not sure how any of Downing’s previous three teams underperformed.
It seems like a good bet that Downing gives this Jets team a better chance to play up to its talent level than Hackett.
