Analyzing Aaron Glenn’s huge 4th downs vs. BAL: Right calls?

As they play out the string of a lost 2025 season, the New York Jets’ most important storyline is the development of their young football team. While the Jets won’t make this year’s playoffs, they can establish sustainable growth that could anchor a playoff push in 2026.

Plenty of attention will be paid to the young players who could be a part of the Jets’ long-term solution. However, it is also crucial to evaluate the Jets’ young head coach.

Aaron Glenn’s first year as the leader of an NFL franchise has been tumultuous, to say the least. Through seven games, there were questions about whether he’d even make it through a single season. After the Jets’ trade deadline fire sale, though, Glenn’s ticket to the 2026 season was punched. Two victories also bought Glenn some extra security, absolving him of the potential winless year that could have overridden the deadline moves.

In fact, Glenn may even be safe through the 2027 season, barring a collapse of epic proportions in 2026. When they traded their two best players, the Jets firmly committed to a rebuild that will take multiple seasons to play itself out. This makes it unlikely that the team will give up on Glenn before he gets a chance to coach all of the future young players New York acquired at the 2025 deadline.

In the meantime, Glenn’s coaching chops can (and should) still be evaluated by fans as they ponder how much they should trust him. While his job security appears strong, and while it isn’t fair to expect many wins out of him until the roster is strengthened, Glenn can still raise or lower his stock through his performance in areas that are entirely within his control.

Nothing falls more firmly into that category than game management.

Glenn’s game management was the subject of immense scrutiny during the Jets’ 0-7 start. From cowardly punts, to blown timeouts, to complacent end-of-half execution, Glenn took plenty of potential points off the board through his poor decision-making.

Since then, we’ve seen signs of growth from the young head coach. Glenn’s ultra-aggressive decisions were instrumental in the team’s Week 8 victory over Cincinnati, and in the ensuing weeks, there weren’t many blunders for fans to take issue with.

The Jets’ Week 12 loss to the Ravens brought Glenn’s decision-making back into the limelight. New York lost a surprisingly winnable game despite being 14.5-point road underdogs, and multiple fourth-down calls played pivotal roles in the outcome.

Let’s dig into two of Glenn’s biggest fourth down choices in Baltimore. Did he sustain the growth he’s shown in recent weeks? Or did his early-season woes rear their ugly head?

Call 1 — 4:16 in Q1, 4th & 5 at BAL 42, 0-0 score

After exchanging punts with the Ravens to start the game, the Jets got a drive going in the mid-first quarter. Starting from their own 21, the Jets drove 37 yards on eight plays to make their way into Baltimore territory. Suddenly, the Jets had an early opportunity to take control of the football game.

Three straight Isaiah Davis runs resulted in a fourth-and-5 situation from Baltimore’s 42-yard line. It seemed as if the Jets were playing for a fourth-down attempt; after Davis ran for a combined three yards across first and second down, the Jets handed him the ball again on third down, seemingly in hopes of getting to fourth-and-manageable.

Davis’ third down run resulted in just two yards, though, setting up a fourth-and-5. The Jets lined up to go for it, but it turned out to be nothing more than an attempt to get Baltimore to jump offsides.

New York took the delay of game penalty and punted, with Austin McNamara delivering one of his signature beauties to pin the Ravens at their own six-yard line. The sequence worked out for the Jets, as they forced a three-and-out and got the ball back at their own 40.

For many NFL teams, fourth-and-5 on the edge of field goal range has become an obvious “go” situation. As heavy road underdogs with a chance to seize an early lead, it would have been understandable if the Jets went for it in that situation, especially since their third down call (which Tyrod Taylor appeared to check into, to be fair) was seemingly intended to set up a fourth down attempt.

Analytically, though, this decision was deemed a toss-up for the Jets. Odds-wise, there wasn’t a “right” or “wrong” call to be made.

According to Ben Baldwin’s model, the Jets’ projected win probability was essentially identical regardless of Glenn’s decision: go for it, punt, or attempt the 60-yard field goal.

It is important to note that these models do not account for the ability of the specific kicker, so the 60-yard field goal attempt was off the table; Nick Folk’s career long is 58, and Baltimore is a difficult place to kick. Going for it and punting were the Jets’ only realistic options, and there wasn’t deemed to be a significant difference in win probability between those two choices.

That meant the choice came down to Glenn’s gut. What did he feel was the right move after accounting for the context of the situation, particularly the factors that cannot be measured by a model?

While the mean win probability was nearly identical between those two choices, they still yield two wildly different outcomes. Punting, of course, is the safe choice, yielding low risk but a low reward. Going for it is the bold move, yielding a great potential reward at the cost of great risk.

As 14.5-point road underdogs, it was arguably advisable for the Jets to roll the dice and shoot for the higher-upside move. Ultimately, looking back, the Jets lost the game 23-10 despite staying tight throughout, so they could have benefited from point-chasing early on.

Nonetheless, the analytics advised that this decision was a toss-up, and it’s worth noting that this particular model does account for the strength of both teams, meaning that the underdog factor was taken into account when calculating the win probabilities of both decisions. For this reason, it’s hard to knock Glenn’s decision, especially since it worked out in that specific sequence.

This is one of those calls that fans may look back on and criticize because of the outcome, but in the moment, there wasn’t really a “right” or “wrong” call. There were two different choices that both yielded essentially the same chance of winning, and regardless of the path chosen, the outcome would have much more to do with the team’s execution than the coach’s decision.

Glenn’s next call was a perfect example of that.

Call 2 — 6:42 in Q3, 4th & 2 at NYJ 42, 7-10 score

Unlike Glenn’s first fourth down call, this one wasn’t quickly forgotten by fans and media, as the result ultimately tipped the game in Baltimore’s favor. It was certainly his most talked-about call in weeks.

New York carried a 7-3 lead into halftime. On the opening drive of the second half, Baltimore responded with an 11-play, 74-yard touchdown drive to take their first lead of the game.

The Jets got the ball back down 10-7, their first possession of the game while trailing. After a kick return to the 34-yard line and three modest gains, they faced fourth-and-2 at their own 42-yard line.

When there’s one yard to go, today’s NFL teams love going for it at all parts of the field (Baltimore did it from their own 27 in this game), but that one extra yard changes the entire situation, as the sneak play is off the table. Even at two yards, though, teams often go for it on the plus side of the field, but on their own side, aggressive fourth down calls are typically reserved for one-yard-to-go situations (unless the team is in a desperate situation, which the Jets were not).

Despite needing two yards to convert, Glenn didn’t hesitate to leave the offense out there. Given the team’s field position and their lack of desperation on the scoreboard at this point of the game, it was a call that immediately raised eyebrows among Jets fans.

The result was a sloppy-looking pass play out of shotgun in which Taylor and wide receiver John Metchie were not on the same page. New York turned the ball over on downs, and Glenn’s decision immediately backfired, as the Ravens took the ball and drove down a short field for a 17-7 lead.

Because of this call’s significance, Glenn had to answer for it after the game, simply stating that he “wanted to be aggressive.”

While the outcome makes this call an easy one to chastise, Glenn’s process was actually sound. The analytics say this was a clear go-for-it situation, improving the team’s odds of winning by over two percent compared to a punt.

Keep in mind that this model accounts for the offensive and defensive strength of both teams, so the popular counterargument that the Jets’ offense isn’t good enough to justify aggressiveness does not apply. The model is already significantly docking the Jets’ odds of converting compared to a normal team, and yet, going for it is still advised. (For instance, if we flip the teams in this exact scenario, the model estimates the Ravens’ odds of converting at 60 percent instead of 52 percent.)

It didn’t work out, so, naturally, the narrative is that Glenn made a foolish decision. If it worked, though, he’d be a genius… just like he was four weeks ago.

Glenn made a multitude of aggressive calls in the Jets’ Week 8 game against the Bengals. Since most of those worked out, leading to a Jets victory, Glenn was applauded after the game for his decision-making.

Now, we’re seeing the opposite effect. The same type of decision is leading to scrutiny because the outcome was different.

It goes to show that fans and analysts need to learn how to separate the process from the results when evaluating players and coaches.

The final result here was bad for the Jets, but the preceding decision is separate from the execution of said decision. Glenn made the optimal decision by going for it. After that, the Jets executed poorly. The offense botched the play, and the defense didn’t limit the damage afterward.

To each their own, but I’m giving Glenn props for this one. The play call and its execution demand examination, as it wasn’t the easy answer to a fourth-and-2 that you’d like to have in your pocket to justify such an aggressive call, but keeping the offense on the field made sense.