The New York Jets blitz at the lowest rate in the NFL
One of the hallmarks of New York Jets head coach Robert Saleh’s defense is a low blitz rate. Saleh and defensive coordinator Jeff Ulbrich prefer to rush four and drop the rest of their defenders into coverage. This philosophy was highly successful in Saleh’s several seasons with the 49ers and his last two seasons with the Jets.
Still, as good as the Jets’ defense is, it’s fair to wonder if it would be even better if they blitzed more often. As much as blitzing leaves some vulnerabilities in coverage, it also puts pressure on the quarterback to make proper reads and get the ball out quickly.
It’s worth taking a look at what happened when the Jets did blitz to try to answer this question. Should the Jets do it more often?
Blitz and pressure rates
According to nflfastR statistics, the Jets sent five or more pass rushers (defined as a blitz) on just 18.2% of their defensive plays against the pass in 2023, the lowest rate in the NFL. For reference, the median rate was 28.6% and the highest was 48.4%.
Note: All blitz statistics below are only on pass plays.
It appears that when the Jets did blitz, they were extremely disruptive. On plays where the Jets blitzed, they caused pressure 61.1% of the time, the highest rate in football. That does not differentiate whether the blitzer(s) caused the pressure or the front four.
Furthermore, the Jets’ pressure rates remain strong when looking at pressure rates for non-edge rushers or interior defensive linemen. Their linebackers and defensive backs caused pressure on 23.8% of their pass rush attempts, the seventh-highest rate in the NFL. In keeping with their low blitz rate, their linebackers and defensive backs had just 130 pass rush snaps, the fewest in the league.
However, the Jets weren’t quite as good at preventing successful plays as they were at generating pressure when blitzing. The Jets allowed a 41.1% success rate on their blitz plays, ranked 13th among defenses. Meanwhile, they allowed a 39.9% success rate when they didn’t blitz, ranked seventh in the NFL.
This difference was particularly prominent on third down. When the Jets blitzed on the money down, they allowed a 44.2% success rate, tied for 25th in the NFL. They blitzed 27.7% of the time on third down, which ranked 22nd among NFL teams. Perhaps blitzing on third down did the Jets more harm than good even though they caused pressure at a high clip. Then again, they also allowed a 38.4% success rate when not blitzing on third down, better than the rate when they did blitz but still not great.
Dropping DL and blitzing
The Jets seemed to have added a new wrinkle to their defense by dropping a defensive lineman into coverage and blitzing a different player. Their edge defenders and defensive tackles combined for 40 coverage snaps in 2023. However, that was only slightly up from the 34 combined coverage snaps they had in 2022. It’s an occasional curveball they throw at an offense, and it often comes from the need to keep a spy on the quarterback.
There is the possibility that the Jets could do it more often this season. Haason Reddick was used as an off-ball linebacker early in his career. He also played in a 3-4 scheme over the past few seasons, meaning he was used in coverage far more than a 4-3 edge defender. Reddick had 42 coverage snaps in 2023, 63 in 2022, 73 in 2021, and 150 in 2020.
There’s a reason Reddick’s coverage snaps have decreased in each of the past three seasons, though. He’s simply not very good in coverage despite his athleticism. From 2020-23, Reddick allowed 38 of 47 targets to be completed (80.9%) for 407 yards and a touchdown, never posting a targeted passer rating below 100.0.
The biggest proof Reddick struggles in coverage? He allowed seven touchdowns in 2019 when he was an off-ball linebacker, which likely prompted the Cardinals to try him out as an edge defender.
Overall, I do not expect to see Reddick dropping into coverage any more than we saw John Franklin-Myers do so in 2023. Even with his smaller size, he’s a net liability in coverage.
Corner blitzes
In particular, blitzing Michael Carter II seems to be a weird change. As the Jets’ slot corner, he is the best in short areas of the field against the player who is the most likely third-down target. So why would the Jets bring him on a blitz and force someone else to cover the slot?
The likely answer is Tony Adams’ proficiency in man coverage. Adams is a former cornerback, and he can cover wide receivers and tight ends in the slot. Adams played in the slot on 25% of his plays, so the Jets chose to make that change sometimes.
Still, there were likely other times when Jordan Whitehead covered for Carter II’s assignment. Whitehead played in the slot on 20.3% of his plays. That was a definite downgrade at the position most likely to be targeted.
When used as a blitzer, Carter II did get pressure a decent amount of the time. On his 18 pass rush snaps, the 16th-most among cornerbacks, he generated five pressures, a 27.8% rate that ranked ninth out of 34 qualifiers (min. 10 pass rush snaps). But Adams got home on 6-of-8 pass rush snaps; wouldn’t it make just as much sense to blitz Adams as Carter II?
Although Carter II is significantly faster than Adams (4.32 speed vs. 4.47), Adams is heavier (205 pounds vs. 184) and has longer arms (31 inches vs. 29⅛). Carter II’s biggest problem with blitzing seems to be reaching the quarterback once he gets there, which would make Adams a better option.
This may seem like splitting hairs over a combined 26 blitzes. The overarching point is that blitzing the slot corner on third down seems like a bad idea. Although specific statistics of individual blitzers by down are currently unavailable publicly, the Jets’ poor success rates on third down could be somewhat correlated with those blitz attempts.
Most inefficient blitzers
Of the Jets’ linebackers, cornerbacks, and safeties, the players who blitzed the most were C.J. Mosley and Quincy Williams. The Jets often mug Mosley up in the A-gap on third down to cover the space left by their wide-nine edge rushers and three-technique defensive tackles. They attempt to keep the offense guessing about whether or not Mosley will blitz. Williams, meanwhile, will more often sneak around the edge, as he did on his game-ending sack against the Broncos.
The problem is that neither Mosley nor Williams gets home very often. Among 71 off-ball linebackers with at least 30 pass rush snaps, the pair tied for 39th with a 17.1% pressure rate (each having an identical line of 7 pressures on 41 snaps). Considering that Williams, in particular, had an excellent season in coverage, it seems to be a waste to send him on a blitz rather than allowing him to stay in coverage. Meanwhile, Mosley’s speed has clearly diminished at 32 years old, making him a less-than-ideal blitzer.
Then again, the Jets do need someone to sugar the A-gap on third down. If Mosley never rushed, there would be no purpose to doing it.
Overall picture
It does seem that the Jets’ philosophy against blitzing serves them well. Although they tend to cause pressure when they do blitz, they also allow the offense a decent amount of success. With excellent coverage personnel and a strong front four, it makes the most sense to let their players stay in their lane.
I doubt the Jets will change much in terms of their third-down blitzing. It seems like it might be a good idea to cut it down to the same level as their blitzing on other downs, but that’s the down when Saleh likes to send pressure. The Jets also don’t seem to care as much about allowing offenses to methodically matriculate downfield, as they assume that the opponent will make a mistake at some point. Saleh would apparently prefer to take the risk inherent in blitzing in search of the reward of a big defensive play.
Don’t count on many changes in the Jets’ blitzing as a whole, even with their changes in personnel. They may make other defensive tweaks, but sending more than four pass rushers likely won’t be one of them.
