The Aaron Rodgers debates rage on in New York Jets land.
Some think he’s the Jets’ best quarterback since Namath. Others see him as a severely declining quarterback who may or may not be a major distraction for the team. There seems to be little in between.
I’ve heard the arguments, read the message boards, had internal debates with other Jets X-Factor writers. Nothing has changed my mind from what I wrote in Week 9 after the Jets lost to the Patriots.
Aaron Rodgers should not be the New York Jets’ quarterback in 2025.
I’ll do my best to explain why and rebut all other arguments in the process. Before I do so, though, I want to add a few caveats.
Suppose we were not talking about Aaron Rodgers, but generic Quarterback X with the same exact situation as Aaron Rodgers. Remove all the emotional attachments to the fact that he is the quarterback of your favorite team (presumably).
To take it a step further, let’s say this were not the New York Jets, but generic Team Y making such a decision. That team does not have a 14-year playoff drought but is simply at a crossroads at quarterback.
And suppose it’s not I, Rivka Boord of Jets X-Factor, writing this article, but generic Analyst Z of whom you have no preconceived notions, positive or negative.
(Maybe you don’t have any preconceived notions about me, but you might have some preconceived notions about others making the same arguments, particularly if you’ve had a heated debate with them. Also, you may now have preconceived notions about Jets X-Factor even if you previously did not.)
So we have Quarterback X, Team Y, Analyst Z. Objective outsider looking in and advising the team about its 41-year-old quarterback. No sticky preexisting emotions involved.
The context
This quarterback suffered multiple injuries in 2022, his age-39 season, including a broken thumb and a rib injury. The quarterback then tore his Achilles four plays in the following season and underwent a quick-fix surgery to try to hasten his healing, knowing it would further inhibit his mobility in the long-term (even more so than an ordinary Achilles repair would do to a 40-year-old quarterback).
During the 2024 season, the quarterback sustained hamstring and ankle injuries, and possibly others. Some of those may or may not have been serious.
These are the numbers the quarterback has posted so far in 2024 compared to 34 qualified quarterbacks.
Accuracy
Data via Pro Football Reference, Pro Football Focus, FTN, and NFL Next Gen Stats
- 62.5% completion percentage (28th)
- 73.6% adjusted completion percentage (24th) – per PFF
- 17.2% bad throw rate (26th) – per PFT
- 70.2% on-target rate (26th) – per PFR
- 72.3% accuracy rate (32nd) – per FTN
- -4.8% completion percentage over expected (CPOE) (32nd) – per NGS
Some completion metrics are not the be-all and end-all of accuracy. Quarterbacks who throw the ball further downfield will generally have a lower completion percentage than those who check it down more frequently.
However, every single one of the quarterback’s accuracy metrics is poor. At best, he is in the bottom 10 in the NFL in this category. At worst, he is the bottom.
Consider that the quarterback’s 72.3% accuracy rate, per FTN, is worse than Mac Jones, Mason Rudolph, Deshaun Watson, Gardner Minshew, and Daniel Jones. His CPOE, per NGS, is ahead of only Anthony Richardson and Cooper Rush and behind passers like Watson, Jones, Will Levis, and Bryce Young.
Many fans will point to the fact that the quarterback has endured constant drops as an excuse for some of his poor metrics. First of all, adjusted completion percentage, per PFF, specifically removes drops, spikes, and throwaways, and he is still in the bottom 10.
Second of all, that’s where metrics like accuracy rate, on-target rate, and bad-throw rate: they are process-based rather than result-based. They do not measure whether the ball was caught or not but rather whether it was placed in the right spot or not. And they paint an even worse picture than the quarterback’s adjusted completion percentage, indicating that he is the problem far more than his receivers.
These metrics look even worse in light of the fact that the quarterback’s average depth of target is just 7.6, ranked 24th. It is not as if he is attempting many deep passes and missing. He’s throwing short but still missing.
The most obvious explanation for this is the quarterback’s age and previous Achilles tear. The quarterback already had poor mechanics throughout his career but made up for it with an incredible arm. His Achilles tear has worsened those mechanics, though, and made him unable to contort his body as he once did. Therefore, the ball often comes out erratically.
(To understand how age can make tiny changes in a player’s mechanics that have a major impact on their performance, check out this article about Justin Tucker’s struggles this season. A kicker is obviously very different than a quarterback, but the concept is still applicable.)
Additionally, the quarterback has sustained multiple leg injuries this season, further eroding his ability to compensate for poor mechanics.
Down-to-down productivity
- 6.7 yards per attempt (24th)
- 5.78 net yards per attempt (24th)
- 5.97 adjusted net yards per attempt (19th)
- 45.3% success rate (26th) – per FTN
- -0.03 EPA per dropback (20th) – per NGS
The quarterback has been highly inefficient on a down-to-down basis. In particular, his inaccuracy has caused his yardage to consistently be very low considering the number of pass attempts he has. He fails to move the ball efficiently.
Big plays vs. turnovers
- 4.7% touchdown rate (12th)
- 1.6% interception rate (12th)
- 4.4% big-time throw rate (13th) – per PFF
- 1.8% turnover-worthy play rate (5th) – per PFF
These are the metrics supporters of the quarterback will point to. Specifically, they look at his 23:8 TD:INT ratio to show that he is still capable of making many big plays while limiting turnovers.
It makes more sense to look at touchdown and interception rate rather than base touchdowns and interceptions because passers who have more attempts (such as this one, who ranks fourth in the league with 488 attempts) are more likely to compile statistics. Using percentages hurts the quarterback’s touchdown number but helps his interception number somewhat.
It is undeniable that the quarterback is still capable of making some “wow” throws and generally avoids putting the ball in harm’s way.
Overall metrics
- 90.8 passer rating (18th)
- 53.9 QBR (21st) – per ESPN
- 246 DYAR (20th) – per FTN
- -3.6% DVOA (23rd) – per FTN
Pro Football Focus grade is not included because it is not an objective metric. You can argue that bad throw rate and on-target rate aren’t, either, but they’re not the same all-encompassing statistics that a player’s overall grade based on film is.
Despite having a high touchdown number and a low interception number, the quarterback still has below average cumulative metrics. This is largely because his yards per attempt and success rate are so low. For a risk-averse passer who throws the ball short a lot, efficiency is paramount. The quarterback has been highly inefficient.
Other context-dependent statistics
Jets X-Factor’s Michael Nania has written article after article exposing the weaknesses in the quarterback’s game in various contexts. Again, pretend it was generic Analyst A who wrote those articles and consider only the evidence set forth.
Here are some of those arguments.
Sack avoidance vs. accuracy is terrible
A graph from NFL analytics writer Scott Barrett on X showcased the quarterback’s season in terms of sack avoidance (based on pressure-to-sack rate) compared to accuracy (based on catchable throw rate). These are metrics designed to isolate a quarterback’s performance from his surroundings.
via X/@ScottBarrettDFB
The quarterback’s 2024 season sits right beside 2022 Marcus Mariota and in the same vicinity as 2023 Zach Wilson, 2023 Sam Howell, and 2021 Justin Fields. In fact, 2023 Wilson had a higher catchable pass rate with a higher average depth of target (7.9), while posting nearly the same pressure-to-sack rate.
To be fair, the graph was posted after Week 10. However, the quarterback’s performance in these areas has hardly changed since then, if at all.
According to PFF, as of Week 15, the quarterback still ranks 24th out of 34 qualifiers in pressure-to-sack rate and 24th in adjusted completion percentage. That makes him one of just five quarterbacks ranked outside the top 20 in both, joining Will Levis, Caleb Williams, Jameis Winston, and C.J. Stroud. Simply put, he has one of the league’s worst blends of accuracy and sack avoidance.
Not consistently explosive or accurate
Regardless of the quarterback’s touchdown and big-time throw metrics, he has not been consistently explosive this season, as demonstrated by his poor yards per attempt mark. He has also been highly inaccurate, as explained above. This leads to a dismal graph placing the quarterback in the same quadrant as Deshaun Watson and Cooper Rush and worse than Will Levis.
Not clutch
Even after leading a game-winning touchdown drive against the Jacksonville Jaguars, the quarterback’s metrics in the clutch are still poor. When clutch is defined as tied or trailing by one score with under five minutes remaining in the game, the quarterback has a 72.8 passer rating.
Before that Jaguars comeback (which, again, was heavily supported by the worst pass defense in the NFL leaving receivers uncovered), the quarterback had posted the following numbers in the clutch through Week 14:
- 26 for 44 passing (59.1%)
- 248 yards (5.6 yards per attempt)
- 6 sacks for -47 yards
- 0 touchdowns
- 2 interceptions
- 0 rush attempts
- 55.9 passer rating
- 4.0 net yards per play (201 yards on 50 plays)
- 12 passing first downs
- 24% first down rate
This may seem like cherry-picking, but in the context of the quarterback’s season, it makes sense to split up his numbers like this. Prior to the Jaguars game, the team was 0-5 in games in which the quarterback had the ball in his hands on the final drive with the chance to win the game. The Jaguars game notwithstanding, he has not come through in the moments that matter.
This is precisely why the team acquired him in the first place. Instead, he has been worse than his predecessor in the clutch.
Metrics compared to backup
Learning from their 2023 mistake, the team made sure to acquire a competent backup quarterback in Tyrod Taylor. Statistically, Taylor was one of the best backup quarterbacks in the NFL with the Giants in 2023 despite his horrific offensive environment (the team had the worst-rated offensive line in the league, and the top weapon in the games he played was Darius Slayton).
Furthermore, a head-to-head comparison of Taylor’s 2023 season and the quarterback’s 2024 season places Taylor comfortably ahead in virtually every category.
Numbers when not under pressure
Perhaps the single biggest flaw evident on the quarterback’s film is his jitteriness in the pocket. This was already abundantly evident in his 2022 season when he received some of the best pass protection in the league (26.7% pressure rate, fourth-best). He has received similar pass protection this season (26.9%) and still consistently appears uncertain and unwilling to trust his blocking and his body.
The quarterback still has a live arm, as evidenced by his big-time throw rate. That was clear in training camp. However, because there is no tackling or hitting in a practice environment, it was impossible to evaluate whether the quarterback trusted himself and had good proprioception (awareness of his body in space).
The biggest statistical evidence of the quarterback’s jitteriness (as well as his inaccuracy) is his numbers when not under pressure among 33 qualified quarterbacks.
- 6.8 yards per attempt (28th)
- 76.4% adjusted completion percentage (25th)
- -4.8% completion percentage over expected (30th)
- 95.0 passer rating (21st)
- 0.06 EPA per dropback (26th)
- 47.3% success rate (24th)
- 33.8% first down rate (24th)
The quarterback’s non-pressure numbers tanked even compared to 2022. It is one of the biggest signs of his severe decline. As a quarterback ages, a drop in under-pressure passing numbers is expected as elusiveness wanes, but the hallmark of a capable quarterback is their ability to operate when not under pressure. The quarterback has been significantly below average even when kept clean.
This is also offensive line-independent, so it eradicates any arguments about the offensive line.
Film
A film review of the quarterback’s 2024 season is a separate article unto itself. Instead, this section will draw on previous articles evaluating the quarterback’s performance on film.
Andrew Fialkow’s weekly reviews demonstrate the quarterback’s struggles the most acutely.
Most of these are from the quarterback’s worst games, but there are countless examples even from games in which he played reasonably well. For instance, his Week 12 game against the Dolphins, when he broke his 300-yard-less streak, is included, and it is aptly titled “114 yards for Garrett Wilson and he should’ve had more.”
Additionally, Michael Nania added substantial film evidence of the quarterback’s jitteriness in the pocket to couple with the statistics.
Finances
A thorough calculation of the salary cap ramifications of retaining or releasing the quarterback can be found here.
The difference between a $49 million dead cap hit in 2025 and a $63 million dead cap hit in 2026 is significant for two reasons. First of all, well, the money: $14 million is not chump change when it comes to the NFL salary cap.
More importantly, keeping the quarterback’s salary on the books for another year prolongs the pain of moving on from him. While the first year for a new general manager and head coach may be tumultuous, saddling them with an albatross for the first two years could make it impossible to fairly evaluate their performance.
Furthermore, is the quarterback worth paying $37.5 million? Some would argue he is because it would rank 17th in quarterback APY. However, the team could easily acquire a quarterback of the same performance level for a fraction of the price, beginning with their own backup, Tyrod Taylor (a lot more on that later), who is scheduled to make $6 million next season.
Additionally, some of the quarterbacks in this passer’s salary range are Baker Mayfield ($33.3 million) and Matthew Stafford ($40 million). Heck, Josh Allen is making $43 million per year. This is not an entirely fair comparison because of the rapidly appreciating level of quarterback contracts, but Mayfield’s deal certainly is, as it was signed in the 2024 offseason. Think about the difference in production.
Of course, the team and quarterback could amend his contract to make it far more team-friendly. The question then becomes how low would be worthwhile and how low he would be willing to go. But again, the baseline for that should be Tyrod Taylor’s $6 million salary ($6.8 million cap hit). Would the quarterback be willing to go down anywhere near there — or even double that, Gardner Minshew’s $12.5 million?
Personality
Many aspects of the quarterback’s personality are worth examining.
The quarterback has taken tremendous criticism for his leadership. He called out a player in the media for running the wrong route, which is the antithesis of the conventions of a quarterback and leader. This is not new behavior for the quarterback; it goes back to his earlier days in Green Bay.
Regardless of what individual players may say about him, the locker room takes notice when the quarterback does not have their backs.
Furthermore, the quarterback is undoubtedly the most controversial personality in the NFL. There is no other quarterback in the league with a weekly show on a huge public platform. The quarterback not only appears on Pat McAfee on a weekly basis but uses that platform to attack the media and promote controversy.
The individual instances of the quarterback’s controversial public comments may be waved away by teammates. However, it is difficult to argue that the constant outside noise does not impact the players. It is already widely known that the team’s players are active on social media and acutely aware of what is being said about them. They undoubtedly know what is going on. Human nature dictates that at some point, this will cause a distraction somewhere.
There is also the matter of acute hypocrisy in many of the quarterback’s statements. For example, ESPN analyst Mina Kimes recently ripped into the quarterback for bashing personality-driven programs on a personality-driven program that he is paid to join. Additionally, the quarterback consistently says he doesn’t care what people think about him while ripping the opinions people have about him.
The quarterback said in 2023 that the team needed to get rid of all the BS outside the building — once again, on The Pat McAfee Show, where he has provided ample outside BS on a regular basis.
There may not be public proof of it (yet), but there is almost certainly a locker room impact from the quarterback’s public persona.
New general manager and head coach
The decision about whether to keep the quarterback is entirely in the team’s hands. That decision should be left to the team’s new general manager and head coach.
If the owner goes above those individuals’ heads and makes it a prerequisite for any hiring, it will undoubtedly deter any candidates who do not want to keep the quarterback. That is the case for any owner-mandated condition for hiring. The team already has experience with this, as Matt Rhule refused to become their head coach in 2019 due to the mandate that Gregg Williams would be the defensive coordinator.
Therefore, regardless of the argument about whether the quarterback should remain with the team in 2025, the decision must be made by the new regime, not the owner.
Any other team
When objectively evaluating the quarterback’s value, the team can ask a very simple question: would any other team in the NFL sign him if he leaves this team?
It is very difficult to say that any team would. As of now, the other teams with possible or likely quarterback vacancies in 2025 are the Browns, Giants, Raiders, Saints, Seahawks, Steelers, Titans, and Colts. Of those teams, the Giants, Browns, and Raiders will almost certainly draft quarterbacks, and the Titans could, as well.
The Seahawks would move on from Geno Smith only if they were ready to bring in someone younger; they certainly would not trade in Smith for this quarterback. The same applies to the Steelers, who are considered likely to retain Russell Wilson, anyway. The Saints could also keep Derek Carr for the same price. Would the Browns sign this quarterback with the Deshaun Watson disaster still looming over their heads?
That leaves the Colts, who already have their aging veteran in Joe Flacco. They will likely continue with Anthony Richardson, regardless.
Therefore, if no other team would take the quarterback, why should this team be different?
This is a question the team should have already asked themselves when they acquired the quarterback, to begin with. There was no other team with even a whiff of interest. That should have given the team pause, but not only did they acquire him, they gave up significant draft capital to do so.
(Anecdotally, when I asked fans of other teams why the team should keep the quarterback in 2025, one Patriots fan answered, “Because it’s better for the Patriots.”)
Refuting common talking points about performance
Here are some of the arguments fans have made to defend the quarterback’s performance this season, and why those arguments are off-base.
“The quarterback ranks 11th in Pro Football Focus grade.“
There is a reason that Jets X-Factor prefers not to utilize PFF grades wherever possible. It is very difficult when it comes to offensive line play and run defense (where few other metrics exist), but in every other instance, this site tries to shy away from utilizing the grades. The simple reason is that there is a lack of trust in the individuals grading the plays. This X post from Joe Blewett encapsulates the reasoning.
The PFF grades do not match the quarterback’s other metrics or the film Jets X-Factor analysts have studied. Andrew Fialkow has put out weekly reviews demonstrating the quarterback’s futility. One week of better play does not change the season-long trend (and there is plenty of context to deny that the Jacksonville game was all that impressive, either).
“The quarterback’s 23:8 TD:INT ratio is excellent, one of the best in the team’s history.“
First of all, the team’s history is completely irrelevant. That would be true of any team, but particularly for an unsuccessful team seeking to reverse its fortunes.
Second of all, Derek Carr had a 25:8 TD:INT ratio in 2023. It’s 15:5 in 10 games in 2024. Caleb Williams’ is 17:5. Touchdown-to-interception ratio is far from the be-all and end-all of a quarterback play. In the context of better overall metrics, it could be a supporting factor, but the underlying metrics explain far more about a quarterback’s performance than the box score.
Of course, if one wants to use the box score, passer rating takes touchdowns and interceptions heavily into account — and the quarterback is 18th in that category, too.
In general, Josh McCown’s 2017 season was superior to the quarterback’s 2024 season.
“This quarterback has dealt with the most drops of any passer, including the most dropped touchdowns (8).“
This point was already addressed above in the accuracy section. The quarterback has been consistently off-target regardless of his receivers’ drops, as indicated by the result-independent metrics.
Additionally, there is ample evidence that a quarterback’s drop rate is often a result of his own inaccuracy rather than his receivers’ issues. It is therefore unsurprising that the quarterbacks with the highest drop rates are Anthony Richardson, Daniel Jones, and Deshaun Watson.
Furthermore, there is a flip side to the argument about dropped touchdowns: the quarterback has also benefited from many short touchdown passes. He has six touchdown passes from inside the two-yard line, the second-most among quarterbacks.
Most importantly, as stated above, touchdown passes are not the be-all and end-all of quarterback play. His down-to-down inefficiency is far more revealing.
“The quarterback’s poor play this season is attributable to injuries that limited his mobility, and he has played better over the last two weeks because he is healthier now.“
There are a number of holes in this argument, but here is the most obvious one when talking about whether the quarterback should be with the team in 2025. If a 41-year-old passer has dealt with numerous injuries throughout the season and seems to get up slowly every time he gets hit, why would that get better in 2025, when he is a year older?
The excuse of being another year off the Achilles injury does not hold both because of his age (being another year older offsets the benefit of being further removed from the injury) and the fact that the surgery he had specifically contained the tradeoff of losing mobility in return for returning more quickly.
For those who add that the offensive line is “the worst in the NFL” (more on that later, but spoiler alert, it’s not true) — what are the chances that will change in 2025? At least four of the team’s current starting offensive linemen will be starters next season (Olu Fashanu, John Simpson, Joe Tippmann, Alijah Vera-Tucker).
Furthermore, the idea that the quarterback played well in his last two games (Weeks 14-15) is suspect in and of itself. Despite many other elevated statistics, the quarterback posted CPOEs of -4.4% and -4.8% in each game respectively. Since his season-long CPOE is -4.8%, this means his accuracy in those games was the same as his baseline for the whole season.
Against the Dolphins, as explained above, the quarterback still missed many opportunities, particularly to Garrett Wilson. The Jaguars have the worst pass defense in the NFL by DVOA, and most of the quarterback’s big plays came on busted coverages with at least three yards of separation. He went 5-for-18 (27.8%) on passes with fewer than three yards of receiver separation.
Every aspect of this argument is heavily flawed.
“He is the only shot of success the team has for 2025.“
The subject of what to do at quarterback next season was already addressed in depth. There may be other options available in free agency, including Sam Darnold and Geno Smith if either one would be willing to return.
Those who believe the quarterback is the team’s only chance to be competitive in 2025 are ignoring the reality on the ground in 2024. If this was supposed to be “The Team,” and it wasn’t, why would that get better when the quarterback is another year older?
Once the mindset turns away from contending for a Super Bowl, the question is largely about tradeoffs. The Jets will need to find their next quarterback at some point; is it worth having this quarterback around until they figure it out?
Based on what the quarterback has shown in 2024, there is no reason to believe he would provide any shot of success in 2025. In fact, as demonstrated above, Tyrod Taylor would be a far better bridge quarterback.
There is also the matter of the money, as explained above. $6 million for Taylor is more worthwhile than $37.5 million or whatever adjusted contract for this quarterback. It takes a lot of wishful thinking to believe that the quarterback will return to a level of play superior to Taylor’s in any meaningful way.
“The team’s offensive line is one of the worst in the NFL, causing the quarterback to be hit a lot and also forcing him to throw a lot due to the lack of a run game.“
The issue of the team’s offensive line has already been evaluated in depth. It is certainly not a bad offensive line, and it is actually a very solid pass-blocking offensive line. Olu Fashanu’s recent performance has made the pass-blocking even stronger, but it was already decent even with Tyron Smith’s struggles.
As stated above, the quarterback has been pressured at one of the lowest rates in the NFL. As previously evaluated, even on plays where the quarterback does not release the ball quickly, he is still pressured less than the league average.
The running game has undoubtedly been a problem. However, the quarterback has not taken care of his part even when not under pressure, making the run game less of an excuse. In particular, his inaccuracy washes away excuses about the run game; it’s not a matter of “the defense knew a pass was coming,” but that the quarterback has been off-target even when there was a window to throw.
“The quarterback’s cerebral nature and elite football mind make it worthwhile to keep him around.“
Is there an NFL Hall of Fame quarterback who doesn’t have an elite football mind? Peyton Manning was perhaps the most cerebral quarterback in NFL history. It didn’t stop his body from giving out in 2015. Tom Brady could probably tell the quarterback where to throw on every play from his seat in the broadcast booth. The question is not the quarterback’s mind but his ability to execute.
Furthermore, the same football mind that made the quarterback a Hall of Famer is self-destructing with this team. In his previous role, a creative and forward-thinking head coach reined in the old-fashioned instincts of the quarterback. With his current team, he runs the show, regardless of the new play-caller’s attempts to modernize the offense.
The idea that the quarterback jettisoned his old coach, Mike McCarthy, in favor of Matt LaFleur because he wanted a more modern offensive system is laughable. As much as he denigrated McCarthy’s play-calling, he also chafed against LaFleur’s.
For example, the quarterback prefers not to utilize motion or shifts to keep the defense honest and mess up rules and matchups. This is part and parcel of a modern NFL offense.
Equally importantly, the quarterback likes to flex a running back out wide to determine whether the coverage is man or zone. Because the entire NFL knows exactly why the quarterback is doing it, they can easily disguise the coverage accordingly. While all offenses use this kind of tell at times, the quarterback does it at the highest rate in the NFL. Alex Rollins explains this clearly.
Playing a 2005 offense in 2024 does not work, regardless of how cerebral the quarterback is.
Keeping the quarterback around will hamstring the entire offense, keeping it outdated.
“The team’s offensive coaching is terrible.“
Whose fault is that? Not only did the team hire Nathaniel Hackett to attract the quarterback, but they could not fire him after one miserable season due to the quarterback’s insistence. They tried to bring in Arthur Smith to be the play-caller, but Smith refused, likely because of Hackett’s continued title as the offensive coordinator. When things spiraled out of control this season, they could not even outright fire Hackett.
As stated above, the quarterback wants to run his offense. As long as that happens, the offensive coaching will look bad no matter what the names are. Offensive line coach Keith Carter is definitely a major problem, but a better offensive line coach could not fix most of the problems that the quarterback has demonstrated this season.
“The team’s defense and kicker are far more responsible for the losses than the quarterback. He would have won many more games with the same defense and kicking as the team had in 2023.“
Again, this is an irrelevant argument. The discussion is about who the quarterback should be in 2025, not who is responsible for the losses. The quarterback’s play has been poor independent of wins and losses. If he were playing at the same level and the team were in the midst of a playoff push due to improved play in other areas of the team, the equation would not change.
“The quarterback has poor weapons.“
It is difficult to call Garrett Wilson and Davante Adams “poor weapons.” There is some evidence to indicate that a team’s No. 2 receiver is more heavily correlated with offensive success than the No. 1.
PFF provided evidence to suggest that a team’s No. 2 weapon is more heavily correlated with offensive success than its No. 1. The team has that. The other weapons may not be strong, but the Bengals, Bills, Broncos, Buccaneers, Cowboys, Dolphins, Lions, Rams, Ravens, Commanders, and Seahawks have all dealt with that issue at least at times this year and last.
Adams may not have always performed like a top receiver in his time with the team, but at least some of that is the quarterback’s fault. He is still open a lot.
“The quarterback wasn’t paid to be a top-10 passer; he was paid to be top 15-20 and he has played like that.“
Regardless of what fans of the team believed, the team itself brought the quarterback in to be a top-10 passer. They did not trade for him to be a top 15-20 quarterback. He has also arguably been outside that range, particularly when it comes to accuracy. It is beyond reason to suggest that he has been a top 10-15 quarterback this season when considering the composite metrics.
If the team wants a top 15-20 quarterback for next season, Geno Smith is the most obvious answer, assuming the Seahawks release him. Interceptions aside, Smith is a more consistent quarterback than this quarterback.
“The team mailed it in when they got the quarterback and thought everything else would fix itself.“
Whether this is true or not (and there is certainly a reason to perceive some truth in it), it is once again irrelevant to the quarterback’s performance.
“Advanced metrics don’t matter when it comes to quarterback play. All these made up, newfangled statistics are subjective and useless.“
The best-run organizations in the NFL heavily utilize analytics, specifically the Ravens and Eagles, who have sustained success for decades. There are limitations in virtually every metric, which is why multiple metrics are cited above.
Evaluating players just based on the box score and Pro Bowls led the team to sign Dalvin Cook, Laken Tomlinson, and Jordan Whitehead, among other players.
“The team cannot rebuild in 2025, and the quarterback is the only way to prevent that.“
It is true that 2025 is a critical year because it represents the last year that the 2022 draft class will be cheap. However, it is abundantly clear that this quarterback will not be able to maximize the talent on the team, based on everything discussed above.
Therefore, should the team remain in limbo while trying to maximize an already lost season? There is talent on this team, but they are far more likely to get the most out of it by hiring the right coaches and bringing in a different quarterback option. The reason Sam Darnold has succeeded this year is the situation he entered, starting with a strong offensive infrastructure and an excellent offensive coach.
The team has the chance to create that same infrastructure for a different quarterback, but only if they are willing to move on from this quarterback, for the reasons mentioned above.
The options are not “this quarterback or rebuild.” Even a rookie quarterback taken outside the top 10 or outside the first round altogether can still potentially make an impact with the right system. The team has a solid offensive line foundation and two strong receivers (assuming they do not trade Garrett Wilson). They can use Tyrod Taylor to begin the season and give the rookie a little more time to develop.
Bo Nix is certainly not a top-tier quarterback, but he has found success at times this season in large part due to an excellent offensive line and a head coach who makes him comfortable.
That is not to say a developmental quarterback is the answer, but it is far more forward-thinking than keeping the team in neutral with a nearly 42-year-old quarterback.
“The quarterback is performing better than Patrick Mahomes this season.“
I already made this argument about the quarterback’s 2022 season. The issue is that Mahomes simply has not played well in 2024 and did not in 2022, either. The comparison is moot because it is about this quarterback’s ability to perform for this team.
Furthermore, Mahomes has shown up in the clutch, whereas this quarterback has not.
“Davante Adams will leave the team if the quarterback does.“
First of all, what a different player will or will not do is irrelevant to the decision about whether to keep the quarterback or not. The team cannot keep one $37.5 million player on the basis of what another $30+ million player will do in response.
Furthermore, Adams has stated he would “love” to play for the team. He did not directly address questions about whether he would stay without the quarterback, but the option is certainly there.
The question about Adams’ future in New York will almost undoubtedly come down to money. His $35.6 million base salaries in 2025-26 are not guaranteed and untenable. If he is willing to take a pay cut and work with the team, he will likely be with them in 2025. If not, he will leave (perhaps via trade if the team can wrangle it).
“No new general manager or head coach would want to enter a situation with a team that does not have a viable answer at quarterback.“
The opposite is actually far more likely. Many general manager and head coaching candidates will be deterred by the presence of a quarterback with a difficult personality who is intractable about keeping his cronies in place and has an incredible amount of control within the organization. A new regime generally wants to put their own stamp on the roster and culture, and keeping this quarterback is the opposite of that.
Certainly, as stated above, foisting a 41-year-old quarterback on any new head coach or general manager candidate as a prerequisite for being hired is a surefire wire to drive away talent.
“The quarterback would be a good bridge quarterback.“
One of the definitions of a “bridge” quarterback is almost always that they are relatively cheap. Over the last few years, Jacoby Brissett, Sam Darnold, Baker Mayfield, and Geno Smith all signed as bridge-type quarterbacks for a maximum of $10 million per season.
(Kirk Cousins is in a different category because Atlanta did not expect him to be a bridge quarterback when they signed him; if they had known they would fall in love with Michael Penix Jr., they undoubtedly would not have committed $40 million a year to a 36-year-old quarterback.)
Even if the quarterback takes a pay cut, he will not come close to those numbers.
Meanwhile, the team has a quarterback who is the definition of a “bridge quarterback” already on their roster in Tyrod Taylor. He is scheduled to make $6 million in 2025. The last time he played in 2023, in a terrible Giants offense, many of his metrics were very solid. As demonstrated above, they were significantly better than the quarterback’s 2024 numbers.
If the team wants to go the bridge route, Taylor makes far more sense just from a financial perspective and a performance evaluation. Additionally, given that Taylor is six years younger, the quarterback’s numbers are more likely to take a nosedive in 2025 than Taylor’s.
Taylor is undoubtedly a significant injury risk, but so is the quarterback.
Did I miss anything?
There you have it, folks: my 6,000-word dissertation on why the Jets should not bring back Aaron Rodgers next season. I tried to address as many of the arguments I’ve seen as possible. I’ve often seen multiple of these talking points joined into one, so feel free to jumble them together as much as possible.
WFAN host Greg Giannotti ripped Jets fans who believe the team should bring back Rodgers as “idiots.” I’ve included the logic here without the ad hominem attack.
It is not a matter of any one argument but a confluence of evidence so diverse and all-encompassing that a rebuttal would require answers to every single point. Any individual point in favor of keeping Rodgers is refuted by a multitude of others.
I still do not believe Rodgers will be back with the Jets next season. The report that Woody Johnson does not want Rodgers back came from NFL Network’s Ian Rapoport, not just the reporters at The Athletic whose information is most likely feeding straight from disgruntled current and former Jets employees.
Rapoport’s most recent statement came on December 1. It is now December 19. I don’t believe a few games at the end of the season will change that, regardless of how recency bias may dictate others’ opinions.
I certainly do not believe that Johnson would make Rodgers’ return a predicate for any general manager or head coach. Even if Rodgers plays well enough to turn the owner from adamantly against the idea to ambivalent, that would not be enough for him to push Rodgers on the new regime.
As I’ve stated in the article, I don’t think any new general manager or head coach would want Rodgers. That’s just an opinion, but I think it is a solid guess based on how new regimes generally treat players from a previous regime.
To me, Rodgers could play at an MVP level from now until the end of the season, and my opinion would not change. In fact, had you asked me at the beginning of the season if Rodgers should return sans a playoff appearance in 2024, I would have said no — no matter what his statistics were.
The primary reason is financial (as understanding the salary cap is near and dear to my heart), but it is also acknowledging that if Rodgers cannot make the Jets contenders, there is little point in keeping him around.
Prolonging the inevitable is rarely a good idea in the NFL. Getting rid of a player a year too early rather than a year too late is the hallmark of a responsible organization.
Rip off the Band-Aid now and go from there, sans Aaron Rodgers.
